The Practice of Corrective Justice by Coleman, Jules L.
Symposium Participants
THE PRACTICE OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Jules L. Coleman*
In a recent book,1 I set out the contours of a conception of corrective
justice, and tentatively explored aspects of its relationship to Anglo-American
tort law. I argued that corrective justice is the principle that those who are
responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and
that the core of tort law embodies this conception of corrective justice. One
could object to my argument on at least two grounds. One might accept my
characterization of corrective justice, but deny that, so conceived, it is reflected
in our tort practices,2 or one might reject my conception of corrective justice.
In obvious ways, this second concern is more fundamental. Perhaps I see
so much (or so little) corrective justice in tort law simply because I have such a
confused idea about what corrective justice is. In any case, the extent to which I
see corrective justice in tort law surely depends on my understanding of it; the
same is true of any would-be corrective justice account of tort law-Weinrib's,
Fletcher's and Epstein's, as well as mine. So it is only natural to ask whether
any of us is right about the content of corrective justice. And that requires an
account of what it means to say that a particular conception of a concept like
corrective justice is correct, as well as an account of the adequacy conditions of
such a judgment.
In this brief essay, I want to tackle some of these meta-ethical concerns.
Before doing so, however, I want to outline the way in which corrective justice
figures in my general approach to political philosophy.
I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND POLITICAL MORALITY
As I see it, the fundamental question of practical reason is: what ought I
do? What I ought to do depends on what there are good reasons for me to do.3
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2. Or that it is reflected in tort law to the extent I take it to be.
3. To say that what I ought to do depends on the reasons that apply to me is not to say
that the justification of everything I do is settled by reason and reason alone. There are many
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In the kind of liberal political morality I defend, the fact that events affect in-
dividual welfare or well-being is normatively important because effects on
individual welfare are the kinds of things that provide agents with reasons for
acting. That others have experienced a loss in welfare or well-being, or are in a
situation in which they are likely do so, is the kind of fact about them that can
provide me with reasons for acting: reasons for coming to their aid, for
example.
This particular project of liberal political philosophy is to connect
reasons for acting with the effects of events on welfare or well-being. There
are at least four variables that figure in this project. If we focus on events that
negatively or adversely affect welfare ("losses" or misfortunes), the four fac-
tors involved in the inquiry are: (1) the moral character of the loss; (2) the
relationship between the loss and those thought to have a reason to act in virtue
of it; (3) the nature of the principles that create reasons for acting, that connect
losses with agents; and (4) the nature and content of the reason the principle,
norm or practice supplies.
Here are some (hopefully, intuitive) examples of how the inquiry works.
If individuals suffer loss as a result of a hurricane or a natural disaster of some
other sort, this fact about them creates a reason for acting in each of us who
stands in a certain relationship to them. Typically, it is enough that each of us
be a member of the same political or geographic community in order that a
hurricane or natural disaster affecting any one of us provide a reason for the
rest of us to do something about it. The duty we have is to come to the aid of
those who are victims of the hurricane, and it is a duty each of us has. So, to
put this in terms of the four factors mentioned above:
In the case of a hurricane or other natural disaster, (1) with respect to the
moral character of the loss, it is not necessary that we characterize or think of
the loss as an injustice or a wrong. The fact that it is a simple but substantial
misfortune appears to suffice. (2) With respect to the relationship of those said
to have a reason for acting, for doing something about the plight of hurricane
victims, there is no requirement that those who have reason to act must have
caused or otherwise been responsible for bringing about the damage. Indeed, a
hurricane is, if anything is, an act of god for which no human agent is
responsible, causally or otherwise. (4) With respect to the nature and content of
the duty (or reason) for acting, it is, first, a duty that falls on individuals quite
generally, and, second, it is a duty to come to the aid of those in need, to help
repair their loss or to alleviate its consequences. The exact nature of the duty
depends on (3) the particular principle, norm or moral practice that grounds it.
Some might defend the duty to aid hurricane victims as being a matter of
charity; others might see it as a matter of beneficence, and others as a matter of
fairness or even distributive justice. If the duty to come to the aid of hurricane
victims is a matter of distributive justice, for instance, it is plausible to suppose
that it falls on all and only those members of the political community governed
by the relevant conception of distributive justice. If, in contrast, the duty to aid
is a matter of charity, it may extend beyond political boundaries and be other-
wise independent of membership in a particular political community. Whether
grounded in principles of charity or distributive justice (or something else
choices I am justified in making for which I cannot offer conclusory reasons. Still, reasons
figure prominently in determining what I ought to do.
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altogether), the duty to come to the aid of hurricane victims is agent-general in
that it applies to each person within the relevant political or moral community.
Sometimes our actions affect the welfare of others in ways that create
agent-specific reasons for acting, reasons that apply to us and not to everyone.
If I promise to meet you for lunch tomorrow, then I have a reason for acting in
a particular way that others do not have. I have a reason to show up. If others
have a reason to show up, it might be because they too have promised you to do
so: it cannot be that they have a reason to show up for lunch because I promised
you that I would. The norms that give rise to the reason I have for showing up
are constitutive of the practice of promising. If I fail to show up, then I have a
reason to apologize that no one else has. If you have lost something by relying
on my showing up, then I may have to make good your losses as well.
Ordinary norms of decency and civility can also give rise to agent-
specific reasons for acting. Suppose that I unintentionally knock you down on a
crowded city street and accidentally bloody your nose. Though my conduct is
not intentional, perhaps not even negligent or otherwise careless, I may have a
host of responsibilities with respect to your care, comfort and welfare. I may
have a duty to lift you to your feet (if you cannot get up on your own), call for
help if you cannot get up at all, wait with and attend to you until help arrives,
and so on. Coming to your aid. in such circumstances is a matter of common
decency. My having a reason to come to your aid does not depend on your loss
being wrongful or unjust; it is simply undeserved and unfortunate. Nor does
my reason for coming to your aid depend on my having done something wrong
or blameworthy, though it appears to depend on my being very weakly
(causally) responsible for what happened to you. Causal responsibility,
however, is not a necessary condition of my having a reason to come to your
aid. Had I been hurled into you by a gust of wind, I might have similar
responsibilities towards you. In that case, my responsibilities to you would have
nothing to do with my being an agent with respect to your injury.
Sometimes duties to come to the aid of another that derive from
conventions of common decency are based on agency (as in the case in which I
unintentionally knock you down); other times they derive from causation with-
out responsibility (as in the case when the wind hurls me into you); but on other
occasions, duties to come to another's aid will require neither agency, fault nor
causation. Thus, individuals in the vicinity of the accident may have a duty to
help you up or to seek aid for you, and so on. It may be enough that those in
the vicinity be capable of helping and of doing so at no great personal
inconvenience. Neither fault, nor agency, nor even the weakest form of causal
connection is necessary to ground a duty to aid. On the other hand, if I have a
special, stronger or more stringent reason for helping-stronger in the sense,
for example, that it being inconvenient for me to wait around with you for help
to arrive would not excuse me from my responsibilities-that may be because I
am causally connected to your injury in ways in which onlookers are not.
None of this is intended to be earth shaking or terribly novel. What we
ought to do depends in part on what we owe others (and ourselves). What we
owe others depends in part on what happens to them, how fortune shines on
them, how our agency affects their welfare, what relationships we bear to one
another and so on. The specific duties we have towards others depends on the
principles that apply to us and the moral and other practices in which we are
1995]
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engaged. The principle of corrective justice is simply one of the norms that
brings us together with the misfortunes of others.
II. THE META-ETHICS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
The principle of corrective justice imposes agent-specific reasons for
acting. To put this in terms of the four factors outlined above: According to
(3), corrective justice, (4), the duty of corrective justice is to make repair, to
make good the victim's loss; (1), only wrongful losses can give rise to a duty of
repair in corrective justice; and (2), an individual has a duty to make good
another's wrongful loss only if he is responsible for having brought the loss
about.
Whereas common decency may require that I lift you to your feet if I
knock you down unintentionally through no fault of my own, the requirement
that I make good your losses (should any arise) invokes the principle of
corrective justice. And because it does, while I may have a responsibility to lift
you to your feet even if I have done nothing wrong or violated no right of
yours, my having a duty to rectify your loss depends on my having acted
wrongfully in some way. Moreover, whereas civility and decency may impose a
duty to come to the aid of those whose mishaps you have witnessed and can do
something about reasonably easily, corrective justice imposes an agent-specific
reason for acting that falls only to those whose agency is responsible for the
harm done, and whose responsibility the harm is.
Put this way, the analysis is incomplete in three ways. First, corrective
justice requires an analysis of what is to count as a loss. There is an important
difference between being harmed and not being benefitted by the actions of
others. Second, it requires an account of what makes a loss wrongful, for the
duty to repair under corrective justice is restricted to wrongful losses.4 Third,
it requires a theory of responsibility, for the duty to make repair under
corrective justice falls only to those who are responsible for the losses for
which repair is sought.5
Most legal theorists who have been interested in corrective justice have
been interested in it insofar as it might figure in an account, explanation or
interpretation of various legal practices, especially tort law, and to a lesser
extent, contract law. For such theorists, corrective justice provides an
alternative to the prevailing economic analysis of the common law. As it
happens, corrective justice accounts of tort law have not been as successful in
capturing the imagination of the legal audience as those based on economic
efficiency.
One reason for this is that there are very few systematic accounts of tort
law based on corrective justice, and it is fair to say that the field is in its
4. Whereas I have only provided a conceptual account of wrongfulness in my previous
work, I have begun the task of providing a normative account of how we are to understand
"fault" or wrongfulness. Cf Jules L. Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune,
(1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
5. Of course, wrongfulness, responsibility and loss are elements in my conception of
corrective justice. Whether they figure in the correct conception of corrective justice, and do so
in the way I allege they do, is the issue before us. In fact, I do not here defend my conception of
corrective justice. Rather, I take up the more basic question of how we ought to think about
defending or exploring a particular conception of corrective justice.
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relative infancy. Another reason, frankly, is that the legal community has found
various economic approaches more persuasive or compelling than those based
on corrective justice. Finally, whereas proponents of economic analysis appear
to agree upon one conception of economic efficiency-so there is only one"economic theory" of tort law 6-there appears to be substantial disagreement
among moral theorists of torts about the content and demands of corrective
justice.
Those who have offered corrective justice accounts of tort law differ
with respect to: (1) the conditions of responsibility; (2) whether in order to
invoke corrective justice, losses must be wrongful; (3) what makes conduct
wrongful within the ambit of corrective justice-and more. It is hard for an
approach to tort law to gain widespread acceptance when disagreement about
what that approach is committed to is apparently so widespread.
Widespread disagreement about its content raises an even more funda-
mental worry about the principle of corrective justice, and that worry is that
corrective justice lacks semantic content; or, if it has semantic content, its
content is subjective, not objective. In either case-no semantic content, or
subjective content-there is a problem for the legal theorist who invokes the
concept of corrective justice as a substantive moral ideal and not just as a
vehicle for expressing approval of certain arrangements and disapproval of
others.
To understand the issues at stake, we first have to indicate ways in which
tort theorists who invoke the concept of corrective justice are committed to its
having objective semantic content; then we need to explain why substantial
disagreement about what that content is invites either a skeptical or subjectivist
interpretation of corrective justice.
In order to meet these demands, it may be helpful if we draw some
preliminary distinctions: first, between cognitive and noncognitive
interpretations of a concept, predicate (or an entire discourse); and second,
between subjective and objective interpretations of semantic content. A dis-
course is cognitive if the majority of its syntactically specified declarative
judgments are fact-stating or truth value worthy. Sentences in a cognitive
discourse are typically either true or false. Cognitivists about moral
discourse-ethical cognitivists-believe that moral judgments are typically
either true or false. Noncognitivists deny that the sentences of a discourse are
not truth value worthy; noncognitive discourses are not fact-stating. Ethical
noncognitivists believe that moral judgments are normally neither true nor
false; rather than describing moral facts, moral judgments express attitudes of
approval or disapproval. An ethical noncognitivist, then, might believe that
moral predicates like corrective justice are used to express approval of certain
institutional arrangements and to disparage others.
The next distinction is between subjectivist and objectivist interpretations
of a concept or an entire discourse. Suppose that" ethical noncognitivists are
mistaken about moral discourse, in which case most moral judgments will turn
out to be either true or false. What makes them true or false? On a subjectivist
6. I have argued that there are in fact several different conceptions of economic
efficiency. Cf. Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Auction and Exchange, in MARKETS, MORALS
AND THE LAW 67-94 (1988). Even economic analysts who agree on a single conception of
efficiency differ with respect to its implications for tort law.
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 19 1995
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
view, moral judgments are true provided they accurately report the speaker's
(or theorist's) beliefs or views. A subjectivist view about corrective justice,
then, would amount to the claim that the content of the concept is fixed by the
speaker's or theorist's beliefs about what that content is. On an objectivist
interpretation, the truth of moral judgments is independent of how particular
speakers or theorists regard it. For a subjectivist, what is the case is fixed by
the beliefs of particular persons; for an objectivist, what individuals take to be
the case has no bearing on what is the case. Whatever the differences between
subjectivists and objectivists are, it is important to keep in mind that both are
cognitivists about moral predicates.
With these roughly characterized distinctions in hand, we can return to
the principle of corrective justice. Judging by the role it plays in their
scholarship, tort theorists who invoke the concept of corrective justice treat it
as objective. Tort theorists are cognitivists and objectivists about corrective
justice. For legal theorists who invoke the concept of corrective justice mean to
treat it as a substantive moral ideal, and not just as a vehicle for expressing
approval of certain arrangements and disapproval of others. This means that
they believe the concept of corrective justice has cognitive content.7 They
believe, moreover, that some conceptions of corrective justice are more
plausible than others; some might even believe that there is one (and only one)
correct conception of it, and so on. This means they believe that the content of
corrective justice is, in a suitable sense, objective. Not every conception of
corrective justice is equally good.
It is commonplace that in order for a predicate or a discourse to admit of
an objectivist interpretation, there must be some considerable agreement or
convergence regarding the core use of the concept(s). The lack of convergence
or coherence is normally seen as inviting some or other form of skeptical
interpretation: either noncognitivist or subjectivist. To understand the
importance of convergence to objectivity, we need to introduce one further set
of distinctions: those between realist and various forms of anti-realist accounts
of the metaphysics of (moral) properties.
Roughly, a realist believes that the existence and character of properties
or predicates, including moral ones, are logically and constitutively independent
of human minds (beliefs) and evidence. The moral "world" is logically and
constitutively independent of how we humans regard it, the beliefs we have
about it, and the evidence we can adduce in favor of those beliefs.
The anti-realist denies what the realist asserts. He claims that the (moral)
world is fixed by human practices and beliefs. For the anti-realist, the way the
world is not logically or constitutively independent of our beliefs about it or the
evidence one can adduce in favor of those beliefs.
All moral realists are cognitivists and objectivists about moral discourse.
The situation is more complex for the anti-realist. Realists are committed to
7. No doubt, in defending or rejecting tort practice as satisfying or failing to measure up
to the demands of corrective justice, tort theorists typically mean to be expressing their pleasure
or disfavor with current legal arrangements. But they mean to be doing so because current
practice either satisfies or fails to satisfy certain substantive constraints that specify the cognitive
content of corrective justice. The expressive function of corrective justice is conceptually
connected to its cognitive content---or at least it is for those tort theorists who invoke it as a
standard for evaluating existing tort practice.
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two claims: that there are moral facts, and that they are mind or evidence-
transcendent. Some anti-realists are noncognitivists. They deny that there are
moral facts at all. If there are no moral facts, then moral discourse cannot refer
to such facts. Therefore, moral discourse is not fact-stating. Anti-realists need
not deny the existence of moral facts, however. In order to qualify as anti-
realist, a theory need deny only that such facts are objective in the way realism
takes them to be. That is, an anti-realist need deny only that (moral) facts are
mind or evidence-transcendent. So anti-realists can be either noncognitivists or
cognitivists.
Must a cognitivist, anti-realist be a subjectivist? The answer is no. Even
though this kind of anti-realist denies that (moral) facts are objective in the
realist sense, he need not deny that facts can be objective in some other sense.
Of course, the burden then falls to the anti-realist to specify the relevant sense
of objectivity. Let's distinguish among three senses of objectivity. At one
extreme is the strong objectivity of the realist. Facts or properties that are ob-
jective in this sense are mind (belief) or evidence transcendent. They do not
depend on human practices or the ways in which humans regard them. At the
other extreme is minimal objectivity. Facts or properties that are objective in
this sense do depend on human practices, beliefs and evidence. Something is the
case in this sense provided that is how most competent language users and
observors regard it. Facts are objective in this sense because they take the
judgment of what is the case out of the "hands" of particular speakers or
observors and place it in the hands of the community as a whole. Minimal
objectivity is therefore normally associated with forms of conventionalism.
From both minimal and strong objectivity we can distinguish modest
objectivity. Facts or properties are modestly objective provided their content is
fixed by how they would be regarded by individuals under idealized or
appropriate epistemic conditions.
These various notions of objectivity play useful explanatory roles, in
particular, they provide (different) accounts of the possibility of mistake,
growth, disagreement and the like. Someone can be wrong in his judgment
according to minimal objectivity if his judgment departs from what most people
take to be the case. On the other hand, one consequence of minimal objectivity
is that most people cannot (logically) be wrong. (What is the case just is what
most people take it to be.) Someone can be wrong in his judgment according to
modest objectivity provided his judgment departs from what it would have been
under ideal conditions of judgment. Moreover, modest objectivity allows that
everyone could be wrong in their judgment provided the judgments they reach
diverge from those they would have reached under ideal conditions of
observation and judgment. It is straightforward how a realist would explain
both local and general mistake.
There are at least three (and probably more) conceptions of objectivity:
minimal, modest and strong. Different concepts of objectivity may be suitable
to different domains. Someone may hold the view that mid-sized physical
objects, e.g., tables and chairs, are strongly objective, whereas moral properties
are either minimally or modestly objective. The kind of objectivity involved in
some discourses, e.g., science, may be the strong objectivity of realism,
whereas that involved in legal discourse may be something considerably
weaker.
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Whichever concept of objectivity is at work in a domain of discourse, the
important point for our present purposes is that convergence is a precondition
of objectivity of any sort. First, for the anti-realist, noncognitivist moral
predicates lack cognitive content, so the question of whether that content is
objective simply does not arise. Second, for the anti-realist, subjectivist moral
predicates are not objective simply because they are reports of the beliefs or
judgments of minimally competent language users and observors. Third, for the
anti-realist, conventionalist (or minimal objectivist) the objectivity of moral
predicates depends on actual convergence of usage among the majority of com-
petent language users and judgers. Fourth, for the anti-realist, ideal observer
theorist (or modest objectivist) the objectivity of moral predicates depends on
individual judgment converging under ideal epistemic or observation
conditions.
Though realism holds that the existence and character of moral predicates
is logically and constitutively independent of human beliefs and practices, the
realist is also committed to convergence over time, as a pragmatic if not as a
conceptual matter. Moral predicates are to figure in the explanations of our
beliefs and judgments. If those beliefs and judgments do not converge over
time, then it is implausible to suppose that strongly objective properties can
explain our beliefs. For if such properties did exist, then they appear to play no
explanatory role in understanding the divergence of our beliefs and judgments.
This is not to say that convergence would be enough to establish that strongly
objective properties lie behind our judgments, but it does suggest that the
absence of convergence gives us cause to worry that such properties do exist.
Of course, divergence in judgment and belief can have a variety of
different sources: disagreement about relevant facts, cognitive shortcomings,
prejudice and the like. So disagreement as such does not undermine realism.
But this simply implies that realism is committed to a form of conditional
convergence: for moral properties to be strongly objective, it is likely
necessary that judgments and beliefs about their instantiation made under
certain conditions, e.g., full information, rationality, etc., would converge.
Convergence or coherence regarding the core of a concept (and its
instantiations) is a precondition of objectivity; and thus it is a precondition of
the objectivity of corrective justice. That is why the apparent widespread dis-
agreement among tort theorists about the content of corrective justice invites
the worry that corrective justice lacks objective semantic content. Either
corrective justice is just a name we give to certain institutional arrangements we
wish to praise, or else it is a gloss we put on our own theories about it: a gloss
we mean for others to treat as objective, but for which we in the end cannot
fully defend by appeal to general reason, principle or practice. This is the fear
that disagreement invites, and the one I mean to allay.
Like others, I am committed to the objectivity of corrective justice.
Unlike others, however, I take this meta-ethical worry about the objectivity of
corrective justice very seriously. I do not believe that it can go unanswered, and
I mean to answer it. Moreover, because I am an anti-realist about moral
properties and moral discourse generally, the kind of answer I want to pursue
must reflect my view that the content of corrective justice depends on human
practices, beliefs and evidence. So, I am both an anti-realist and an objectivist
about corrective justice. For me, then, the content of corrective justice depends
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on the practices in which it figures, but it is not fully fixed by how I or anyone
else happens to regard it.
Some of my critics have wanted me to defend my conception of
corrective justice by deriving it in some way from a set of first principles,
from more basic principles of justice; while others have objected to my
emphasis on what I have called, "middle level theory": that is, my emphasis on
extracting principles and norms from existing practices, including legal ones. In
fact, I have not tried to defend my conception of corrective justice as following
from a more general theory of distributive justice, nor have I argued for it in
some contractarian manner, by trying (futily no doubt) to establish that my
conception would be chosen by rational agents under certain specified
conditions, and so on.
Perhaps I am mistaken in taking the meta-ethical approach to corrective
justice (and to other moral concepts as well) that I have taken. But I am wrong
only if some other meta-ethical view about moral predicates is correct. So
someone objecting to my approach, and not merely to my execution of it, has to
defend, or, at least, must have in mind a different kind of meta-ethics. Perhaps
a subjectivist or noncognitivist can fault me for looking to our practices for the
content of corrective justice. In their minds, the problem is that corrective
justice has no content (noncognitivism), or its content is subjective and fixed by
how particular persons regard it. My mistake is in looking to communal
practices. Or a realist might fault me for looking to practices at all, for, in her
view, the content of corrective justice is fixed by some set of natural facts, not
by the behavior of individuals. I am unmoved, however, by the objection to
middle level theory, of extracting the content of our norms and principles from
the practices in which they figure when it is advanced by those who are
unprepared to defend some other meta-ethics. Many who advance this objection
are apparently committed to the fashionable view that one can engage in
substantive normative ethics while remaining agnostic on meta-ethical issues.
This view of the relationship between meta and normative ethics strikes me as
mistaken.
I have looked to see how the concept of corrective justice figures in
various practices, including tort law, as a way of getting a handle on its content.
Because I am an anti-realist about moral predicates, I am committed to the view
that the core of corrective justice is drawn from the practices in which it
figures. And that is part of the meaning of the phrase I have employed in
speaking of corrective justice as a practice-"the practice of corrective
justice"-a phrase that George Fletcher claims to find wholly mysterious. 8
There are, of course, legitimate, general concerns one might have about
my kind of approach to fleshing out the content of corrective justice. Consider
two: First, by focusing on the practices in which the concept figures as the
source of its content, aren't I just committing myself to a kind of
conventionalism in which all we can say, for example, about corrective justice
is that the community regards it in a certain way? Corrective justice is fixed by
our practices, and, if that is the case, how can corrective justice serve as a
criterion or standard for assessing our practices?
8. For a review of RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 1, written by someone who
appears not to have read it, see George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justice for Moderns, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1658 (1993).
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 23 1995
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
Second, if I focus on practices as the source of the content of corrective
justice, then I will treat tort law as one such practice. If tort law helps to give
content to the concept of corrective justice, in what sense can corrective justice
serve as a criterion for assessing existing tort practice? In what sense can we
even ask whether and to what extent existing tort practice implements the
principle of corrective justice? Mustn't there be some distance between
corrective justice and tort law in order for us to be able to answer either of
these questions?
Let's consider the first question, the second being largely an extension of
the general worry it raises. Unfortunately, I cannot answer this serious and
legitimate concern in any detail here. I hope the following remarks are not so
cryptic as to be unhelpful. Generally, my view is that our practices contain
adequate resources for critically assessing what those practices at any given
time happen to be. That is, certain practices (I believe law is one of these) are
both conventional-that is, their content depends on what people do-but their
content is not fixed by what people at a particular time happen to be doing. I
like to think that in such practices "truth outruns the practice."
How can a practice be conventional and have resources sufficient for self
assessment? Let me try to illustrate what I have in mind by exploring the well-
known positivist view that law is a matter of convention or social fact. With
respect to law, Hart famously held that law consists in social rules and that the
content of social rules is fixed by convergent practice. Dworkin takes this to be
a statement of conventionalism, attributes it to all positivists, and powerfully
exploits its shortcomings. The problem is that such an account does not provide
a plausible understanding of key features of legal practice, including the nature
of theoretical disagreement, the existence of right answers in hard cases, and
the possibility of large scale, pervasive mistake. In the Hartian view of social
rules, law runs out-and discretion begins-when behavior no longer con-
verges. Isn't law possible even in the face of disagreement about its content or
requirements? Dworkin thinks the answer to this question is in the affirmative.
If law extends beyond convergent behavior, and if the content and requirements
of social rules is fixed by convergent practice, law cannot consist in social
rules. Roughly, law cannot be a matter of sociology or social fact as the
positivists contend; instead, it must be a matter of substantive moral argument,
as Dworkin contends.
The problem is not with the view that law is a matter of social fact or
convention; the problem is with the Hartian conception of what a social rule or
convention is, and what its requirements are. For Hart the content of a social or
conventional rule is fixed by the scope of convergent behavior. What a rule
requires is restricted to the scope of that convergent behavior. Where
convergence, ends so too do the duties to which the rule gives rise. This is not
the way I think about social or conventional rules. In my view, conventional or
social rules require both convergent behavior and shared understanding. There
must be sufficient convergent behavior to establish the existence and core of a
social rule. The shared understanding (which is also typically reflected in
behavior) determines the kind of practice or rule the behavior instantiates.
For some practices, the understanding may be that the full content of the
rules and the duties to which they give rise is fixed by the scope of convergent
behavior. Participants in such practices understand that they have no duties
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under the rules beyond the range of convergent behavior. Let's imagine that
stopping at red lights is such a practice. If most people stop at red lights, then
(provided other conditions are satisfied) individuals would have a duty to stop
at red lights under normal circumstances. But now suppose that some people
don't stop at red lights after midnight (in the absence of other traffic), while
others continue to stop even when there is no danger in merely slowing down
then moving on. Were stopping at red lights the sort of practice in which the
duties imposed were fixed by the scope of convergent behavior, then
individuals would have no duty to stop at red lights after midnight. Or if they
had such a duty it would not be imposed by the social practice of stopping at
red lights. On the other hand, if the shared understanding were that the scope of
the duties imposed by the rule extended beyond convergent practice, then
whether individuals uniformly stop at red lights after midnight will not settle
whether they have a duty under the rule to do so. The behavior that reflects this
understanding consists in the offering of arguments among participants
regarding how the rule is to be understood and thereby extended. Such rules
are social or conventional in spite of disagreements about their content
precisely because their existence and character depends on substantial
convergent behavior and a shared understanding of its character.
If I am right, the content of moral predicates derives from the ways they
figure in various practices. That may make these concepts conventional in a
familiar sense of that term. But their conventionality does not mean that the
content of the predicate or rule is fixed by the scope of convergent behavior.
Even conventional rules can have content that extends beyond the scope of
convergent practice. Whether they do depends on the kind of practice involved.
And that depends on the nature of the shared understanding about the kind of
practice the participants are engaged in. If the understanding is that the scope of
the practice extends beyond convergent behavior-an understanding that is
itself expressed in the behavior of participants offering arguments for
extending the practice one way rather than another-then the practice may be
one that has internal resources sufficient for self-assessment.
If this is right about certain concepts and practices, I have the beginnings
of an answer to the second worry someone might have about my approach to
corrective justice. Recall, that worry is that if tort law is among the practices to
which we appeal in fixing the content of corrective justice, how can corrective
justice be a criterion for assessing existing tort law? If the content of corrective
justice depends on but is not fully fixed by existing practices, then the concept
may yet provide a criterion for critically assessing even those practices whose
existence is essential to the concept's existence. Were tort law the only practice
in which claims to repair for harms suffered at the hands of others were made,
then much of the content of corrective justice would be fixed by tort practice.
But claims to repair are part of our ordinary moral practices as well, and
substantially so. For that reason (among others) we can assess tort law in the
light of corrective justice even if we recognize that the content of corrective
justice is itself partially fixed by tort practice.
1Il. THE CORE OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
With this digression into meta-ethics (and into the meta-ethics of
corrective justice) complete, I return to the concept of corrective justice. My
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thought is that while there is substantial disagreement about the particulars of
corrective justice, the scope of the disagreement can be easily overstated. I want
to suggest that the concept has a coherent core drawn from the practices in
which it figures. All viable accounts of corrective justice, whatever their sub-
stantive disagreements, are committed to the centrality of human agency,
rectification, and correlativity. That is, the claims of corrective justice arise
only with respect to losses occasioned by human agency. Other forms of
misfortune do not fall within its domain. Different conceptions of corrective
justice might differ with respect to the bounds and conditions of human agency,
and why agency matters, but all share the view that only losses resulting from
human agency can give rise to claims in corrective justice.
Second, claims in corrective justice are claims to repair or rectification.
Again, different accounts are likely to pick out different objects of rectification.
One way in which Ernie Weinrib's theory differs from mine is that in his
account the object of rectification is the "wrong," whereas in my account it is
the "wrongful loss." The difference between us reflects differences in our
overall political and metaphysical commitments. For me, corrective justice is to
be understood as a practice within a liberal political morality that emphasizes
autonomy and well-being: thus, the emphasis on loss, which I think of in terms
of diminished welfare. For Weinrib, the Hegelian, the important normative
objects are abstract and only indirectly connected to human welfare or interests:
thus, the emphasis on wrongs-understood as strongly objective metaphysical
objects. Whatever our differences, both of us are committed to the importance
of rectification as an element of corrective justice.
Finally, corrective justice involves correlativity of some sort.
"Correlativity" may be an unhappy phrase, but perhaps I can clarify it. The
claims of corrective justice are limited or restricted to parties who bear some
normatively important relationship to one another. A person does not, contrary
to the view I once defended, have a claim in corrective justice to repair in the
air, against no one in particular.9 It is a claim against someone in particular.
Different conceptions of corrective justice might flesh out the conditions under
which individuals could come to stand to one another in the appropriate way,
but all are committed to providing an account of those conditions as a way of
explaining in part what corrective justice is. Some might emphasize causation:
the fact that I caused your wrongful loss is enough for us to stand in a
relationship such that if you have a claim in corrective justice it is against me,
and if I have a duty of repair, it is to you. Some might argue that responsibility
is the key concept: responsibility is connected to causation, of course, but not
coextensive or cointensional with it. Someone can be responsible for the acts of
others (acts and consequences he did not cause), and someone may perform acts
that have untoward consequences for which one is not responsible (acts and
consequences he caused, but for which he is not responsible). Some might
emphasize being in the position of having been able to prevent the accident at
the lowest cost (the cheapest cost-avoider). If I could have prevented your
injury at a cost lower than anyone else (and I do not and you are injured), then
I stand in the appropriate relationship to you that gives me a reason to repair
9. Cf. Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND.
L.J. 349 (1992).
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your loss.10 Whatever view one has about this matter, the important point is
that in every account of corrective justice, there is presumed to be a
relationship between the parties that makes the claims of corrective justice
appropriate to them-and not to others."
IV. WHAT CORRECTIVE JUSTICE Is NOT
Any account of the content of corrective justice will'be both
controversial and prescriptive. But we should not overemphasize the
differences at the expense of the coherence of the core of the concept. If I am
right in claiming that corrective justice requires agency, rectification and
correlativity, a variety of theories of tort law, whatever their substantive merits
may be, do not involve corrective justice. Let me mention three.
First, there is my former account of corrective justice, which I called
"the annulment thesis." According to the annulment thesis, corrective justice
requires annulling wrongful gains and losses. Understood in this way, the
annulment thesis lacks the dimension of correlativity that I have suggested is
part of the core of corrective justice.
A second account of tort law that has only recently begun to receive the
attention it deserves is Stephen Perry's. In Perry's account, there is a two step
analysis.' 2 First, we have to identify the class of individuals who are candidates
for having the loss imposed on them. Here he relies on the important notion of
"outcome responsibility" originally developed by Tony Honore.13 It turns out in
Perry's view that in the typical tort both the victim and the injurer are outcome
responsible for the harm: typically, moreover, no one else is. Then the question
becomes, how should the loss be allocated between these two parties. In Perry's
account, only losses resulting from human agency fall within its ambit: that is
entailed by the principle of outcome responsibility. Moreover his analysis
relies on some notion of correlativity since the victim and injurer are presumed
to be connected to one another through the important relationship of outcome
responsibility. But his is not an account of corrective justice because it does not
invoke the concept of rectification or repair. Rather, his is best seen as an
approach to tort law that emphasizes a concept of "local distributive justice," in
which the principle of outcome responsibility fixes the range within which the
allocation or distribution question is raised and answered. His is an account of
10. For a discussion of the way in which the concept of the cheapest cost-avoider can
figure in an account of corrective justice, see infra Section V.
11. I want to be perfectly honest not only about what I hope to accomplish, but also
about what I have accomplished-which is considerably less. I am committed to the claim that
the content of corrective justice is drawn from the practices in which it figures. I have suggested
that so conceived the principle of corrective justice is not fully fixed by the convergent behavior
of the population at any given time. Such a view allows me to treat the concept of corrective
justice as both anti-realist, objective and, therefore, critically useful. I have not fully developed
the argument that practices can be conventional in the way I suppose they can be, nor have I
demonstrated conclusively that the practice of corrective justice is of this sort. The plausibility of
my overall argument depends ultimately on my providing those arguments.
Next, I claim that if we focus on the practices in which it figures, we will note three core
elements: agency, rectification and correlativity. In fact, I have not shown that these are features
of our practices. That too remains to be done, but not here.
12. Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449
(1992).
13. Tony Honor6, Responsibility and Luck, The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, 104
LAW Q. REv. 530 (1988).
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the distribution of loss, not the rectification of loss.
Finally, as an alternative to my conception of corrective justice, Ronald
Dworkin has suggested another two-step analysis.14 First, distinguish losses that
result from human agency from other sources of misfortune or loss. Then ask
the following question: What does fairness require with respect to the allocation
of losses resulting from human agency? The principles for allocating loss that
are required by fairness within that domain constitute the principles of
corrective justice.
Whatever else can be said either in favor of or against this account, it is
not an account of corrective justice. Whereas it emphasizes human agency, it
ignores both correlativity and rectification. Instead of asking whether a victim
has a right to recover against a particular person who stands in a certain kind of
relationship to her (a relationship that makes that question meaningful and
appropriate), it asks how shall a loss be allocated. In short, my previous theory
of corrective justice lacks the correlativity dimension; Perry's lacks the
rectification element; and Dworkin's suggestion lacks both. This does not mean
that none of these "moral ideals" is attractive or the best interpretation of
important aspects of our legal practices. It means only that they are not genuine
accounts of corrective justice.
V. THE PRACTICE OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
If I am right, any plausible account of corrective justice will emphasize
agency, correlativity and rectification. In this section, I want to fill out my own
conception of corrective justice by exploring other features of the duty to
repair the wrongful losses for which one is responsible. These are not features
that have been emphasized by other writers, and at least some of them are likely
to be quite controversial.
The duty to repair in corrective justice is pre-political and non-
instrumental. As I have said on several occasions now, the content of corrective
justice is neither epistemically, constitutively, nor logically independent of the
moral, legal and political practices in which it figures. Even more interestingly,
whether or not the principle of corrective justice gives rise to a duty of repair
in a particular community is conditional on the practices, legal and otherwise,
that already exist within the community. Let me briefly explain each of these
characteristics of corrective justice.
To say that corrective justice is pre-political is to say that there may be
duties of corrective justice even in the absence of political institutions designed
to enforce or implement them. Corrective justice cannot exist independent of all
practices whatsoever, but it does not require political or legal institutions to
enforce the duties to which it gives rise. So, in the absence of a state, there may
be a duty of corrective justice: that is, a responsibility in morality to repair the
14. This account was suggested to me by Ronald Dworkin at a seminar at NYU Law
School in the fall of 1993 as an alternative to the account I developed in RISKS AND WRONGS
which was the topic of discussion in the seminar. I do not mean to attribute the view to him as
his ultimate position. I bring it up, not to criticize Dworkin, but to elucidate my own views by
contrasting them with several plausible alternatives. Indeed, this paper developed primarily as a
result of the discussion during that seminar, and, in particular, in response to a question of
Thomas Nagel's about whether the duties of corrective justice are natural, and if they are
whether legal or other institutions could cancel them.
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wrongful losses for which one is responsible.
This is not to say, however, that the duty in corrective justice is a natural
duty in the moral realist sense: that is, a duty whose existence is logically and
constitutively independent of human practices and motivations. If a duty is
natural then it imposes responsibilities on individuals regardless of how they
regard themselves and independent of whatever practices they may have. The
source of the duty is not human practice, but moral fact (or natural facts on
which the moral fact is said to supervene or to be reducible to). One can accept
the prepolitical character of corrective justice without accepting the
metaphysics of natural duties. And that is precisely the kind of approach I have
in mind.'
The duty of corrective justice is also non-instrumental in an important
sense. To see this, compare the duty one has to repair the wrongful losses for
which one is responsible (under corrective justice) with the alleged duty one
might have to repair all losses which one could avoid (in the future) at the
lowest cost. The phrase "one could avoid at the lowest cost" or "cheapest cost-
avoider" might be understood as a definition or an analysis of responsibility:
the cheapest cost-avoider is all we mean by the responsible party. This is hardly
a compelling characterization of the very complicated notion of responsibility,
but if it is the right one, then there would be no difference between the
economic and corrective justice principles stated above. In contrast, if the
cheapest cost-avoider can sometimes be different from the responsible party,
then it is hard to make sense- of the claim that individuals who are the cheapest
cost avoiders have a duty to repair simply in virtue of their being the cheapest'
cost avoider apart from such a duty figuring instrumentally in serving a
desirable collective or social policy goal of reducing accident costs. Imagine no
such collective goal. Can it make sense to say that those people who are in fact
the cheapest cost-avoiders have a duty to repair wrongful losses? Not really.
But once we introduce the "collective" goal of reducing accident costs, such a
duty makes perfectly good sense, but only instrumentally in the pursuit of the
collective goal. We need no notion of a joint goal or aspiration to make sense of
the claim that those responsible for the misfortunes of others have a duty to
repair them. It is part of our common sense morality or moral practice that
individuals have such a duty. That is what I mean by saying that the duty of
corrective justice is non-instrumental. It does not mean that such a duty can
serve no instrumental role, and in my book I indicate the way in which such a
duty might figure in a liberal political theory more generally.' 5
Whereas corrective justice is both pre-political and non-instrumental,
legal and political practices can affect the content of the duty corrective justice
gives rise to in many ways. Let me mention two. First, such duties can affect
what behavior will count as satisfying or meeting the duty. Second, such prac-
tices may even cancel the duty altogether. To see how the former claim can be
made out consider the duty to be charitable. Imigine that there is a hurricane
that leaves 100 people homeless. The cost of providing shelter turns out to be
$300,000; imagine, moreover, that there are 1,000 people in the community
who have a duty to be charitable, to come to the aid of the 100 homeless people.
Suppose the local municipality puts a project in place to provide shelter that
15. See especially the discussion of the relationship of corrective justice both to
distributive justice and to stability in RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 1, at 67-70, 350-54.
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requires each member of the community to contribute $300. Discharging the
duty to be charitable can be accomplished by making a payment of $300 to the
fund. Now there may be other ways of discharging the duty to be charitable in
this instance. Given the state sanctioned project, giving one homeless person
$300 would not count as discharging one's duty, even though providing the
same amount to the general fund would. So the legal practice can sometimes
determine whether an act constitutes discharging a duty whose existence does
not depend itself on legal practices. I want to suggest, in effect, that the same is
true of corrective justice.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, whether one has a duty in
corrective justice within a particular community can depend on the other
practices in place for allocating losses. So, to use a familiar example, in New
Zealand, where all accident costs (we may presume) are handled through the
general tax coffers, whether they result from human agency or not, there is no
practice of corrective justice. There are no duties to repair the wrongful losses
for which one is responsible. This does not mean that there are no duties that
fall to those responsible for harming others-duties that do not fall to others.
Those responsible for loss may well have duties to make amends in other
morally relevant ways: e.g., to apologize. It is just that there is no moral duty
to make repair. This suggests that the duty to repair is conditional on other
practices.
Again, this does not mean that there is nothing we might be able to say
regarding the morality of New Zealand's practices for allocating accident costs.
We might point out that a practice of corrective justice tightens the bonds of
community and of personal responsibility (if, in fact, it does), and that, to the
extent a community lacks a practice of corrective justice, it may risk eroding
these bonds as well as the liberal ideal of community. What we could not say,
however, was that New Zealand had failed in some way simply by not having a
practice of corrective justice. So even though the duties of corrective justice are
non-instrumental, whether a community's not having a practice of corrective
justice marks a moral shortcoming, depends on what's lost morally, from the
point of view of other principles, e.g., autonomy and responsibility, to which a
practice of corrective justice contributes.
VI. SUMMARY
Let me see if I can sum up what I have tried to say about corrective
justice. Corrective justice is, in my view, the principle that one has a duty to
repair the wrongful losses for which one is responsible. The principle of
corrective justice, like other similar norms in a community serves to link agents
with the misfortunes of others. The content of the principle is not independent
of human practices with respect to it (as it would be for a moral realist). Yet
the content of the principle is not fully fixed by the practice at any given time:
what corrective justice requires is not fixed by what people regard it as
requiring at any given time.
Any particular conception of corrective justice will be a contestable
interpretation drawn from practices, including legal ones, in which the concept
figures. In the conception I want to offer, corrective justice requires agency,
rectification and correlativity (at a minimum). The practice of corrective
justice is such that the duties imposed by it are pre-political-that is, they do
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not rely on legal or other political institutions for their implementation or
enforcement; they are also non-instrumental, that is, they make sense
independent of our having some set of collective goals (like cost avoidance) that
they might serve; and while the duties of corrective justice do not depend on
legal practices for their enforcement, legal and other practices may have an
effect both on the content of the principle of corrective justice and whether
such a duty exists at all in a particular community.
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